Multinational corporations account for 80 percent of all transfers of goods and services across borders, either within their own affi liate transactions or through networks with independent providers. As a result, the term supply chains is rapidly becoming the new norm in discussing the spread of trade and investment around the globe.
INTRODUCTION
Developing countries that can diversify and upgrade their production and export profi le enjoy greater welfare gains and more rapid growth rates than countries that simply do more of what they have always done. Foreign direct investment off ers rich opportunities for emerging economies to attract middle-and higher-skill operations and to link into multinational corporate global supply chains. 
But accomplishing this goal involves overcoming tricky imperfections in information markets

I. USING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO DIVERSIFY AND UPGRADE THE EXPORT BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY ECONOMIES: NEW EVIDENCE
Development theory has shifted in recent years from preoccupation with simple export-led growth to examination of the composition of exports. Emerging economies benefi t not simply from exporting ever larger amounts of what they have always produced but also from upgrading and diversifying their export base: those that manage to export a wider set of higher-quality (higher unit value) goods and services grow more rapidly and enjoy greater welfare gains than those that do not (Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik 2007) . New exports to regional markets can off er valuable opportunities for export diversifi cation.
Penetrating developed country markets is particularly important (Mattoo and Subramanian 2010) .
To a certain extent, emerging market nations can rely exclusively on their own indigenous entrepreneurs to accomplish the objective of upgrading and diversifying exports. But the evidence shows that the globalization of industry off ers large and rapidly growing opportunities for developing countries to harness foreign direct investment to this task. Popular discussion often portrays foreign direct investment (FDI) in manufacturing and assembly as fl owing primarily to lowest-skill, lowest-wage activities in the developing world, such as garments and footwear. But a closer look at the data paints quite a diff erent picture: by far the majority of manufacturing FDI in developing countries fl ows to more-advanced industrial sectors, and the weighting toward more skill-intensive investor operations is speeding up over time.
As table 1 shows, the fl ow of manufacturing FDI to medium-skilled activities (e.g., transportation equipment, industrial machinery, electronics and electrical products, scientifi c instruments, medical devices, chemicals, and rubber and plastic products 1 ) is nearly 10 times larger per year in the most recent period for which data are available than the fl ow to low-skilled, labor-intensive operations-and this fl ow 1. Sector-specifi c data are presented in appendix A.
has been growing. Th e ratio of higher-to lower-skill-intensive activities was roughly 6 times larger in 1990-92 and approximately 14 times larger in 2005-07.
Th e globalization of industry, then, off ers great potential for developing economies to tap into the middle-and higher-skill-intensive supply chains of multinational corporate investors. (Limited but nonetheless real prospects for building supply chains around FDI in the extractive sector are discussed in section V.)
As a consequence of the deployment of middle-skill operations to emerging markets, most manufacturing FDI is not driven by a search for the very lowest-wage workers, even though diff erences in wage levels between home and host economies may be substantial. Th e International Labor
Organization (ILO) and other organizations do not collect precise data on workers by job classifi cation and compensation. But the evidence supports the proposition that as skill levels increase, so do wages.
Survey data from industry sectors such as autos and auto equipment, electronics, chemicals, and industrial equipment-in comparison with garments and footwear-show that foreign investors in higher-skilled activities pay their workers two to three times as much for basic production jobs and perhaps 10 times as much for technical and supervisory positions as employees in comparable positions in lower-skilled multinational corporation (MNC) operations (ILO 2007) .
Not only do foreign investors in middle-skill-intensive operations pay higher wages and off er more benefi ts to their employees than those received by workers in low-skill-intensive plants but also they typically pay a wage premium in comparison to comparable domestic fi rms, according to data on foreign investor wage premia from Asia, Latin America, and Africa (Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey 1996; te Velde and Morrissey 2003) . Indeed, Robert Lipsey characterizes as a "universal rule" that foreign-owned fi rms and plants pay higher wages than domestically owned ones (Lipsey 2006; also Hijsen 2008) .
What accounts for this wage premium paid by foreign investors in the developing world? In one of the most detailed studies of this phenomenon, Lipsey and Fredrik Sjöholm (2004) draw on an extensive dataset of plant and worker characteristics from almost 20,000 fi rms in Indonesia to separate out the relative infl uences. Th ey fi nd that foreign investors paid 33 percent more for blue-collar workers and 70 percent more for white-collar workers than did locally owned fi rms. But they point out that foreign investor operations may have diff erent characteristics from ostensibly similar domestic companies.
Controlling for education, MNCs paid more for workers with a given education level than domestically owned fi rms. Controlling for region and sector, the foreign pay diff erential was 25 percent for blue-collar workers and 50 percent for white-collar workers. Controlling for plant size, energy inputs per worker, other inputs per worker, and proportion of employees who were female, the wage premium in foreignowned establishments was 12 percent for blue-collar and 22 percent for white-collar workers. In short, foreign investors were paying their employees more than what might be explained by increased 5 productivity coming from greater inputs per worker and higher effi ciency resulting from larger scale of production.
Lipsey and Sjöholm concluded that approximately one-third of the foreign investor wage premium could be attributed to region and sector, one-third to plant size and other inputs, and one-third was left unexplained. So, quite at variance with the widespread notion that most foreign investors travel to developing countries to exploit local workers, or that mobile capital takes advantage of inherently fi xed labor, the pleasing puzzle in the data is why multinationals pay local workers more than they need to in order to keep their plants operating effi ciently. Perhaps foreign investors provide skills training (unobserved by econometric analysis) that increases productivity, or perhaps they want to secure a more stable labor force by limiting turnover. Investigating these intriguing hypotheses requires further research.
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What measures should would-be developing country hosts take to attract investors to locate higherskill-intensive activities and generate higher-skill-intensive jobs in their economies? Finding an answer requires a close look at the market failures and obstacles that impede the foreign investment decision process for such international companies.
II. MARKET FAILURES AND IMPEDIMENTS TO ATTRACTING HIGHER-SKILLED FDI IN MANUFACTURING: MISPERCEPTIONS AND CORRECTIONS
Th e launch of the World Bank's Doing Business indicators in 2004 institutionalized the widespread belief
that the key to attracting foreign direct investment lies in improving the ease of doing business for all fi rms in a would-be host economy. As of 2014, the ease of doing business indicators include assessment of the requirements for starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors (including intellectual property rights), paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency, employing workers, and fostering entrepreneurship. To these should be added sound macroeconomic conditions such as low infl ation rates, sustainable budget defi cits, and realistic exchange rates.
But while attention to these microeconomic, macroeconomic, and institutional reforms may be a necessary condition to attract FDI, it likely will not prove suffi cient. Research shows that the proactive eff orts of an investment promotion agency (IPA) to market the country can provide an important boost in attracting FDI (Morriset and Andrews-Johnson 2003; Wells and Wint 2000) .
Torfi nn Harding and Beata Javorcik (2011) provide rigorous econometric backing for this proposition. Comparing data from 109 countries with an IPA and 31 without, they fi nd that the presence of an IPA is correlated with higher FDI infl ows, both overall and specifi cally to sectors targeted by the 2. For a useful summary of research on the FDI wage premia, see Beata Javorcik (2014) ; she explores the hypothesis of rent sharing between investors and their workers.
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IPA. Th ey compare FDI infl ows to targeted sectors, before and after targeting, with those to nontargeted sectors during the same period and fi nd that active IPA targeting doubles FDI infl ows. Th ey control for changes in host country business environment by including country-year fi xed eff ects, for heterogeneity of sectors in diff erent locations by including country-sector fi xed eff ects, and for shocks to supply of FDI in particular sectors by adding sector-time fi xed eff ects. In checking for reverse causality, they fi nd no evidence that targeting took place in sectors with relatively high or low infl ows in the years preceding targeting.
Even more important, Harding and Javorcik (2012) In addition to responding to investor inquiries, the IPA has a central role to play in facilitating a potential investor's maneuvers through host regulatory requirements. Under ideal conditions, the IPA acts as a "one-stop shop" that helps secure permits and approvals from an array of ministries, dealing with taxation, immigration, land acquisition, environmental protection, and the like. In practice, however, many IPAs are simply a one-more-stop shop, another layer of bureaucracy.
Besides being a proactive and responsive marketing agency and a facilitator to secure permits and approvals, what does the IPA need to accomplish to attract mid-and higher-skill-intensive investors in 7 new and untried sectors? What further public sector interventions do would-be hosts need to take to induce more-sophisticated multinationals to undertake novel activities in the domestic economy?
Th e answer depends on how market failures and other obstacles to the investment decision-making processes are understood. Here the basic models and paradigms most widely used in the economics community turn out to be faulty or at best misleading.
Roberto Dani Rodrik (2003, 2005) have laid out the most widely used framework for understanding the diffi culties of structural transformation from lower-skilled to new higher-skilled activities in a developing country market: the diffi culties in attracting mid-and higher-skill-intensive investors to new and untried sectors spring from a combination of information asymmetries and the need for cost discovery in the midst of appropriation problems. 3 Th is fatal combination can be overcome by providing subsidies to fi rst movers and information that the host has but the investor is unaware of.
Th e would-be host must then persuade the investor to reveal the exact production costs at a new site under conditions where, if the investor is successful, rivals are likely to rush in before the fi rm is able to be adequately compensated for taking the initial risk of making the fi rst investment. Th e policy solution is to subsidize the fi rst investor and entice him to take the risk. How much should the subsidy be? Th e amount should be based on the economic and social externalities derived from attracting the fi rst and then subsequent fi rms into the new sector.
Th e evidence, however, shows that each of these concepts is signifi cantly off -base, with important implications for host country policy design.
Th e literature on using IPAs to market a country, summarized above, shows that information markets are far from perfect and that there are signifi cant payoff s from providing descriptive materials to potential investors. But the well-worn economic concept of information asymmetry does not capture what the true market failure consists of. Information asymmetry implies that one side (the would-be host) knows things the other side (the potential investor) does not. But examination of actual eff orts to attract a fi rst investor to a novel sector in an unfamiliar country reveals that neither side knows whether a prospective site will become a favorable location for the project.
Th e evidence shows that the uncertainty about which the middle-or higher-skill-intensive investor wants reassurance is whether the new production site can be seamlessly woven into the global network on which the parent's competitive position in international markets depends. Th e prospective host must therefore focus expenditures on ensuring smooth integration and reducing the likelihood of disruptions.
When the fi rst mover/investor's operations turn out to be successful they often create demonstration eff ects, signaling eff ects, and follow-the-leader behaviors. But the cases examined below exhibit scant 3. For a formal model of the cost discovery phenomenon, see Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2009). indications of appropriation problems (indeed, successful fi rst movers often undertake follow-on investments of their own in short order, even as other investors move in).
With regard to subsidizing fi rst movers, host country measures to ensure smooth integration and reduce the likelihood of disruptions-such as infrastructure improvements, public-private partnerships in vocational education, labor market reforms-may or may not have a subsidy component. What is clear, however, is that the timing of host country expenditures to reassure fi rst investors about smooth integration into global supply networks must be undertaken long before calculation of economic and social externalities is anything but a gleam in the eye of the IPA chairman, economic minister, or president of the would-be host.
A review of the most thoroughly researched case of a developing country's eff ort to attract a sophisticated international investor to an untried site in a novel economy-Costa Rica's struggle to persuade Intel to build a semiconductor plant near San José-off ers an opportunity to identify the challenges for emerging market policymakers.
III. USING FDI TO UPGRADE AND DIVERSIFY THE EXPORT BASE: THE CASE OF COSTA RICA AND INTEL
From the earliest days of his administration, in 1994, President José Figueres was determined that Costa
Rica would not remain stuck with a lowest-skill/lowest-wage foreign investment profi le. In previous administrations Costa Rica had begun with the logical fi rst steps to attract FDI, what today would qualify as fortifying the country's basic doing-business indicators. Building on the recognized tradition of democratic stability unique in Central America, Costa Rica had used a fi rst round of economic reforms to attract FDI in labor-intensive export operations in the 1980s.
As labor costs rose in Costa Rica and international competition in garment and footwear sectors intensifi ed, Figueres restructured the country's investment promotion agency, CINDE, and gave it a mandate to seek out more-advanced international investment, epitomized by the campaign to attract the semiconductor producer Intel (Spar 1998 (Spar , 2006 Nelson 2009) . A public-private agency originally funded by USAID, CINDE had a staff of 10 working in investment promotion-fi ve had MBAs or equivalents (one had an MS in international fi nance from the University of London), three had law degrees, and two had bachelor's degrees in business administration (Nelson 2009, 45) . All were fl uent in English and had international experience either working with foreign fi rms or studying abroad. CINDE paid salaries higher than civil service positions.
"Campaign" is an apt description of Costa Rica's eff ort to overcome imperfections in information markets. On Intel's short list for its next semiconductor fabrication plant were Indonesia, Th ailand, As part of its global strategy, Intel feared work stoppages that might be associated with disputes with unions. While the company was willing-and expected-to pay higher wages than counterpart fi rms (it planned to pay more than one-and-a-half times the average manufacturing wage in Costa Rica), senior executives at headquarters did not want unions in its plants anywhere in the world (Nelson 2009 (Larraín, López-Calva, and Rodríguez-Clare 2001) . But Intel's behavior since its original investment of $115 million, in 1997, does not appear to have been slowed by inability to earn suffi cient returns; if anything, the company benefi ted from cluster eff ects as other investors moved in. Intel followed its fi rst plant with a second, then added a global distribution center.
In the decade and a half since 1997, Intel has invested an additional $900 million in Costa Rica and increased the number of local employees from 500 to 2,800. In 2013 the company exported more than $2 billion in products per year, some 6 percent of Costa Rica's GDP. Th e best such offi cials may be able to manage is to structure as many expenditures as possible so as to benefi t the economy as a whole, not just foreign investors. To the extent possible, Costa Rica designed the infrastructure improvements as public goods that could be enjoyed by all actors in the domestic economy.
Public outlays to expedite Intel's freight shipments were part of the airport renovation. Th e vocational training program was designed to train workers and engineers who could be employed anywhere in the IT industry. Th e Figueres administration did off er Intel a special rate for electricity, designated as a discount for large-scale users. At the time Intel was the only such user in the country, but Costa Rican authorities argued that this was not a subsidy because later large-scale users would enjoy the same rate, as eventually came to pass.
To expand on the arguments made above, the case of Intel in Costa Rica recasts the conventional way economists typically think about providing subsidies. In particular, the simple notion of cost discovery on the part of fi rst mover/investors-in the characterization of Hausmann and Rodrik-has to be refi ned to understand the challenges faced by both investor and host. As the evidence shows, the potential investor in a novel middle-or higher-skill-intensive operation wants to be reassured that the resulting goods or services can be integrated seamlessly into the global network on which the parent's competitive position in international markets depends. Th e would-be host wants to fi gure out how best to provide such reassurance by lessening the likelihood of interruption. Th is leads to such inducements as infrastructure improvements, vocational training initiatives customized to the needs of the investor, and provisions for labor market fl exibility (not lowest wage payments) that directly support such integration.
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To be sure, from the perspective of cost accounting, an electric power outage, a delay at the port or airport, a shortage of technical workers, or a labor walkout to protest layoff s can be entered into a spreadsheet that shows added costs of doing business. But reassuring the investor about the quality control in production, and the speed and reliability of incorporation into the fi rm's global network, cannot be addressed by simply providing a larger fi nancial subsidy, lowering tax rates, or off ering submarket input costs. Rather, the would-be host needs to address head-on the investor's concerns about seamless integration. Th is has direct implications for (1) the powers entrusted to the investment promotion agency or the interministerial investment promotion committee, (2) programs to support investment promotion off ered by external donors, including by the World Bank Group or regional development banks, and (3) the debate about the role of industrial policy in developing countries.
IV. EVIDENCE FROM SUCCESSFUL CASES OF FDI USE TO UPGRADE AND DIVERSIFY EXPORTS: PENANG IN MALAYSIA AND CZECHINVEST IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
It would be rewarding to undertake a broad survey, with a sample size large enough to conduct econometric testing, of developing country eff orts to use FDI to upgrade and diversify the host export profi le, with measures for imperfections in information markets, for appropriability problems, and for coordi- 
Penang in Malaysia
If Costa Rica off ers the most thoroughly studied case of a successful eff ort to attract higher-skilled FDI to a novel location, the investment promotion performance of the regional government of Penang in Malaysia provides perhaps the largest pre-China illustration of using FDI for structural transformation 6. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005 a) fi nd that greater fl exibility in a host country's labor market in absolute terms or relative to the investor's home country is signifi cantly associated with larger FDI infl ows. Th eir study uses a variety of proxies for labor market regulations refl ecting the fl exibility of individual and collective dismissals, the length of the notice period, and the required severance payment, with controls for other business climate characteristics. 95 percent of them locals, at its facilities, and as of early 2014 Altera had generated two to three dozen patents per year from its "bleeding edge" workplace.
As in the case of Costa Rica, there are no indications of appropriability problems as fi rst mover electronics fi rms in Malaysia moved from low-wage assembly into higher-skill production and design activities. Th e US and European fi rms that led the upgrading of electronics operations-notably Motorola, Texas Instruments, Hewlett-Packard, Ericsson, and Philips-steadily added more complex operations and design functions. Firm-level microdata document Motorola's affi liate moving from rudimentary printed circuit board assembly for pagers and private radio systems to worldwide responsibility for design, development, and automated manufacture of double-sided six-layer printed circuit boards and for design and development of integrated circuits for disk drives and other peripherals (Rasiah 1995; Capanelli 1997) . Hewlett-Packard progressed from assembly of calculators to manufacture, tooling development, process design, and even chip design for portable printers, desktop computers, and servers. Refl ecting on the evolution of Texas Instruments, an executive observed, "We came for the cheap labor and the tax advantages, but we are staying because of the expertise we have built up here. As far as assembly and testing are concerned we have more expertise here than we have in the US. We sometimes 15 have to send our Malaysian engineers to the States to solve their problems" (Lim and Pang 1995, 111 European fi rms to keep the highest-level design and production of more sophisticated products at home in Japan.
Before the worldwide recession of 2008, the electronics industry had become Malaysia's leading manufacturing sector, accounting for 29 percent of gross domestic output, 56 percent of exports ($75 billion), and 29 percent of total employment in the manufacturing sector (nearly 300,000 workers, supervisors, engineers, and managers). Th e economic downturn hit the Malaysian export sector particularly hard, but by 2012 Malaysian electronics exports had climbed back to $55 billion.
In the electronics industry in Southeast Asia, Robert Lipsey (2000) notes an interesting evolution:
foreign fi rms begin by being responsible for the early surge in exports but then fi nd their proportion of exports, although still growing in absolute terms, being overtaken by exports from indigenous fi rms, evidence of spillovers and imitation. In the electrical machinery classifi cation (primarily consumer electronics and parts), US and Japanese affi liates accounted for more than half of all exports in the late 1970s but only 22 percent by the mid-1990s. In contrast, in the nonelectrical machinery classifi cation (primarily computers, accessories, and parts), where the pace of technological change remained high, the US and Japanese proportion of exports increased between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s.
Th roughout the transition from a natural resource to a manufacturing exporter, Malaysia allowed foreign fi rms a substantial amount of labor market fl exibility. At fi rst, foreign investors insisted that unions be excluded from the new export zones, including in the Penang Bayan Lepas industrial parks.
Th ey also insisted that investors be freed from the requirement to have local partners or to participate in the Bumiputra (affi rmative action) system. Beginning in 1989, the government allowed in-house unions to be set up and organize in the electronics industry. But the bias toward labor market fl exibility has continued-issues relating to layoff s, retrenchments, transfers, and job assignments are deemed to be outside the scope of bargaining at the fi rm level in the private sector. Until 2012, there was no minimum wage. In the Global Competitiveness Index 2012-13, Malaysia ranked second out of 148 countries around the world in the relationship between pay and productivity, and 26th in ease of hiring and fi ring.
While the labor market fl exibility in Malaysia has been criticized from some quarters, supporters point out that the country has managed to achieve an unusually successful record in combining employment creation and economic growth. Moreover, the incidence of absolute poverty has declined dramatically, from 52 percent in 1970 to below 5 percent in the contemporary period (CDE 2013 
V. EVIDENCE FROM MORE PROBLEMATIC CASES OF USING FDI TO UPGRADE AND DIVERSIFY EXPORTS: TANGER MED IN MOROCCO AND IDZS IN SOUTH AFRICA
Many of the same lessons, in mirror-image form, emerge from the experiences of countries that have not had such successful outcomes.
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Tanger Med in Morocco
In Morocco, inward fl ows of FDI rose from less than 1 percent of GDP in the 1990s to an average around 4 percent of GDP during 2003-07-before the international fi nancial crisis caused such fl ows to plummet around the globe. 9 But the larger volume of precrisis fl ows into Morocco remained centered in low-skill, low-value activities, and Morocco's export profi le is still less sophisticated than that of the Philippines, El Salvador, China, India, Indonesia, and Th ailand (IBRD and IFC 2006) .
As countries on the periphery of the European Union prepare for renewed growth and recovery, the fundamentals in Morocco to attract higher-skill-intensive MNCs are favorable. Th rough the upheavals of the Arab Spring, the country has enjoyed relative political and economic stability, with widely noted progress in deepening Moroccan democratic institutions. Th e economic fundamentals are strong: the macroeconomic environment is stable, with low rates of infl ation, a modest buildup of international reserves, and a moderate public-debt-to-GDP ratio (especially external debt). Besides enjoying a benefi cial market access agreement with the European Union, the country completed a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States in 2006.
In recent years, Morocco has taken two major steps to prepare to attract more-sophisticated FDI.
First, it has renovated and energized the country's investment promotion agency. With Renault as an anchor investor, annual auto production in Tangier is expected to reach 340,000
vehicles when phase II of Renault's investment program is completed in 2015 (depending on the extent of economic recovery in the European Union). Th e French auto giant aims to bring in Nissan as an investor and hopes to induce a broad array of international parts suppliers to colocate in the Tangier complex.
Renault and Moroccan authorities are working together to establish a center for vocational training in the automotive sector, with a curriculum to be designed by the private sector participants.
But this promising combination of aggressive investment promotion and massive infrastructure improvement, backed by vocational training initiatives, is taking place in a restrictive labor market regulatory structure. In Moroccan labor law, there is no distinction between laying off and fi ring workers, with a requirement of six months' notice plus a large but not authoritatively specifi ed severance package.
Th is latter ambiguity means that the size of any given package will probably be challenged in court, with the company having to continue to pay workers while the outcome is adjudicated. Labor market survey data show that severance costs are equal to 85 weeks of salary in Morocco versus 53 weeks on average elsewhere in the region. Morocco ranks 67th of 148 in the Global Competitiveness Index of the relationship between pay and productivity, and 93rd in ease of hiring and fi ring. Not only is the heavy-handed labor market regulation a disincentive for prime investors and their international suppliers to set up operations in Morocco, it also hinders fi rms from moving easily into the supply chains of foreign companies that do decide to invest (a subject investigated in the next section). Hiring new workers resembles a decision to bring them into the company for life, which is diffi cult when entering into an international supplier arrangement, where demand may be highly cyclical. in Casablanca who rapidly found at least temporary work elsewhere). In other sectors where growth is less dynamic and union control of the workplace is more pronounced, the ability of foreign investors and domestic companies to adjust to external market conditions is likely to be considerably more diffi cult in the absence of labor market reform. Th e expansion of the automotive hub in Tangier may depend on such reform.
Industrial Development Zones (IDZs) in South Africa
Drawbacks from infl exibility and overregulation in labor market policies are much more evident-and increasingly acknowledged-in the case of IDZs in South Africa (CDE 2012) . Across the South African economy, rigid labor regulations are beginning to be recognized as a major factor contributing to unemployment rates above 30 percent, higher for youth-the Centre for
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Development and Enterprise in Johannesburg estimates that the unemployed in the South African economy make up 40 percent of the workforce (CDE 2013) . Th e regulations are also a major impediment to attracting new foreign investments or stimulating reinvestment.
Conclusion
To summarize the analysis thus far, globalization of industry off ers a target-rich environment for emerging market authorities to attract foreign investors that can help upgrade and diversify the host production and export base. But to achieve this result, important market imperfections and obstacles must to overcome. Table 2 shows a comparison of measures to attract FDI in the fi ve countries discussed.
Successful use of FDI to upgrade and diversify the host production and export base can generate additional benefi ts by creating backward linkages from foreign multinationals to local fi rms. Th e task of creating competitive supply chains that stretch broadly and deeply into the host economy poses further challenges.
VI. ENHANCING BACKWARD LINKAGES FROM FOREIGN INVESTORS TO LOCAL FIRMS: MULTIPLYING AND THICKENING SUPPLIER NETWORKS IN THE HOST ECONOMY
Th e past decade has seen growing analytic attention to the conditions that enhance the likelihood of backward linkages and spillovers from foreign investors to other fi rms in host country markets. Th is section aims to pull together policy recommendations that will be useful for host authorities and for external donors to promote backward linkages and spillovers, especially but not exclusively in the form of vertical local supplier networks to multinational investors. Th is is a fairly commonsense task, but requires overcoming widespread analytical confusion and misperceptions.
Beginning horizontally, foreign investors would naturally prefer to avoid creating rivals to their market position. But workers and managers often leave foreign plants to start up their own; local fi rms learn from watching the operations of foreigners. Competitive pressures from foreign entrants push indigenous companies to raise their performance. In Mauritius, six years after the beginnings of FDI-led export growth, 50 percent of the capital invested in export processing zones came from domestic companies founded by owners who had started in foreign fi rms nearby (Rhee, Katterback, and White 1990 Controversy about attracting fi rst-tier suppliers from abroad arises, however, from apprehensions that they suppliers may denationalize the host industrial base, crowd out local capital, and siphon off the best workers and managers. Such apprehensions require scrutiny. It will be useful to look in detail at some carefully investigated instances in which a host country opened a sector to foreign investors and their fi rst-tier suppliers. In the vertical direction, Walmex did not pull many fi rst-tier suppliers into the Mexican market. But it did revolutionize how warehousing, distribution, and inventory management were done, requiring drivers with certifi ed credentials to set up appointments at centralized warehouses and make deliveries on standardized palettes (rentable from Walmex) with contents shrinkwrapped and cushioned by corner protectors (Javorcik, Keller, and Tybout 2008) . Suppliers were required to reduce prices and provide product innovations on an annual basis. Th e result was heavy competitive pressure in what had been, as the Mexican participants themselves described it, a protected, clubby, and somewhat corrupt industry (Javorcik, Keller, and Tybout 2008, 1565) . 10 Many Mexican suppliers were driven out of the market, but the scale of opportunities for those that remained were much larger: roughly 25 domestically owned small and medium-sized producers of storebrand (marca blanca) detergents and cleaners, for example, proved able to hold their own against national and international competitors.
Once again, restructuring of an industry exhibited Schumpeterian creative as well as destructive dynamics that are not captured in conventional apprehensions about denationalization and poaching of superior workers and managers. As for the phenomenon of crowding-in versus crowding-out of investment, the liberalization of investment in the Indian auto sector and the entry of Wal-Mart in Mexican retail show that introduction of new foreign competitors often leads to crowding-in and crowding-out simultaneously.
10. It was subsequently revealed that Wal-Mart itself, in setting up its retail outlets in Mexico, engaged in widespread bribery.
Th e important outcome to observe, however, is the changing economic performance of the entire sector, not some arbitrary measurement of the absolute amount of capital invested at any particular moment in the sector (as is mistakenly highlighted in the crowd-in/crowd-out debate).
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From the point of view of the host country, it is surely desirable that indigenous fi rms rise to the occasion, improve their competitive skills, and fl ourish. But what if the survival of these fi rms turns out to be relatively weak? Is the incorporation of better workers into higher-productivity activities in foreign fi rms less good for host country welfare or growth potential than leaving those workers employed in lower-productivity domestic fi rms?
Th e analytics of what is best for an emerging market host economy might profi t from redirecting the "Who Is Us?" perspective to developing countries. Originating in the debate about the pros and cons of Japanese investment in the United States in the 1980s-90s, the perspective posits that what is most benefi cial to the domestic economy is a function of which fi rms create the highest-skilled, highest-paying jobs, the least expensive products, and the most competitive exports independent of the nationality of the owners (Reich 1990 ). Th at is, domestic policymakers-in developed as well as developing economiesshould focus on the quality of jobs and strength of productive potential from fi rms in any given sector, rather than instinctively giving preference to home country owners.
If there are concerns about foreign ownership, they should be addressed objectively. Th ere may be a concern that foreign fi rms will reinvest less than domestic fi rms, but the evidence usually shows that successful foreign fi rms have a strong record of reinvestment. Might foreign fi rms be more skillful in using transfer pricing to avoid host country taxes? Quite possibly, but this risk should be addressed by improving arm's-length pricing audit capabilities on the part of host tax agencies, not consigning whole economic sectors to subpar domestic fi rm performance. Does foreign ownership raise legitimate questions about national security? Th e conditions in which foreign ownership might pose plausible threats to national security-as opposed to implausible apprehensions-are quite narrowly defi ned, and infrequently met (Moran 2009 ).
Turning from the attraction of MNC supplier fi rms from abroad to the creation of vertical supplier relationships among fi rms in the host economy, contemporary survey data-from sectors as diverse as furniture, chemicals, food products, printing, pulp and paper, fabricated metals, rubber, electrical machinery, communications equipment, and motor vehicles-document that direct assistance between foreigner and local supplier takes multiple forms. It may include training, help with setting up production lines, coaching in management strategy and fi nancial planning, advance payment and others kinds of fi nancing, assistance with quality control, and introduction to export markets (Javorcik and Spatareanu
a).
11. For thorough analysis of the extensive literature on crowding-in vs. crowding-out of investment, see Moran (2011 Using evidence from manufacturing establishments in Indonesia collected by region since 1988, when FDI operations were predominantly export-oriented, Gertler (2005, 2008) investigate the relationship between the presence of foreign investors and the total factor productivity of domestic fi rms upstream and downstream from their operations. But since foreign fi rms may simply be settling in areas where productivity is already high, the next step is to observe how total factor productivity of the indigenous fi rms changes as the presence of foreign investors increases. Again, however, there may be external reasons why foreigners would increase their presence as local productivity grows (e.g., improvements in the business climate). To address the possibility that investors choose sites where suppliers are already productive, Blalock and Gertler include establishment fi xed eff ects to judge whether the performance of upstream or downstream fi rms gets better after the arrival of the foreigners. To deal with the possibility that some external factor is raising the productivity of all fi rms, they include industry-year fi xed eff ects, and region-year fi xed eff ects to control for changes in conditions aff ecting all market participants. Finally, to deal with the possibility that suppliers might experience some exogenous improvement that was not part of industrywide or regionwide changes, they use a simultaneity correction (developed by Steven Olley and Ariel Pakes).
At the end of these steps, they fi nd productivity improvements in upstream and downstream local fi rms that are signifi cantly associated with the rise in foreign investment and not derived from other factors. Th e better performance of these indigenous fi rms in turn results in lower prices, increased output, higher profi tability, and increased entry of vertically linked fi rms in the Indonesian economy.
But does correlation, however carefully traced, show causation here? And if causality can be established, what might be the mechanisms through which it takes place? Here-highly unusual for the economics community-Blalock and Gertler supplement their econometric investigations with survey data from actors on both sides. 13 Th ey report that the foreign investors and the Indonesian local company managers identifi ed specifi c kinds of uncompensated assistance fl owing between the parties, including help with production, quality control, and business management. US and Japanese multinationals testifi ed that they assisted targeted suppliers to increase effi ciency and reliability, moving from small-scale 12. Th is brief review of contemporary research that follows is all the more important because Dani Rodrik, for example, cites quite dated skeptical appraisals of the potential for vertical spillovers and appears unacquainted with the newer investigative approaches and evidence.
13. Th e authors report, however, that they were required to drop most of the observational data at the insistence of the Journal of International Economics editors and referees.
orders to larger regular purchases from local fi rms that showed promise. In the case of Japanese investors, the usual practice was to introduce successful Indonesian suppliers to members of the parent company group elsewhere in Southeast Asia, thus creating an export externality. But a positive outcome was by no means inevitable or automatic-some Indonesian fi rms failed to pass muster, others dropped out, some were abandoned by the foreigners due to subpar performance.
Using many of the same econometric measurement techniques, Javorcik (2004) fi nds productivity spillovers between foreign investors and upstream domestic fi rms in Lithuania. To address the problem that unobserved fi rm, time, and regional factors may exist that aff ect the correlation between productivity and foreign presence, she uses time diff erencing as well as a full set of fi xed eff ects for year, industry, and region. She estimates a separate production function (taking into account the Olley-Pakes correction)
for each industry. Since foreign entry into downstream sectors may increase demand for intermediate products, which in turn will allow local suppliers to reap the benefi ts of scale economies, she introduces controls to provide confi dence that the outcome can be attributed to the eff ects of knowledge spillovers rather than simply to larger-scale economies.
Javorcik fi nds productivity spillovers from foreign investors to affi liates with shared local ownership, but no signifi cant relationship with wholly owned affi liates (an outcome she associates with the inclination of the latter to import more intermediate inputs). A one-standard-deviation increase in the foreign presence in downstream sectors is associated with a 15 percent rise in output of each domestic fi rm in supplying industries. She separately considers spillovers from export-and domestic-oriented affi liates, and fi nds that in this relatively competitive market setting, both types of FDI generate spillovers to the supplying industries with no signifi cant diff erence in magnitude.
So it is important to discover that vertical externalities from foreign investors to indigenous fi rms can be rigorously identifi ed and objectively observed. But such spread of backward linkages has varied greatly across countries, and is by no means assured. Which policies to promote backward linkages are, and are not, successful?
Widespread evidence shows that creation of local supplier networks in emerging markets depends on how wide the gap is between the capabilities of the local business providers and the sophistication of what is demanded by the foreign purchaser. Ari Kokko (1994) shows that spillovers between foreign affi liates and local fi rms in Mexico vary as a function of the productivity diff erence. Kokko, Ruben Tansini, and Mario Zejan (1996) observe the same phenomenon in the Uruguayan manufacturing sector, as do Xiaming Liu, Chengang Wang, and Yingqi Wei (2009) in China. Blalock and Daniel Simon (2009) discover a nuanced outcome: local fi rms with larger size and greater absorptive capacity gain more from downstream FDI, but local fi rms with weaker productive abilities show stronger motivation to adopt new technologies provided by the downstream foreigners.
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A fi rst order of business for developing country authorities therefore is to adopt policies that increase the productivity and reliability of domestic companies. Like the foreigners they hope to serve, these companies need open, transparent, dependable conditions in which to expand and become competitive; such conditions include access to low-cost imports, relatively fl exible labor markets, and protection of intellectual property rights.
Of particular importance is evidence that limited access to credit constitutes an important constraint to the development of host country supplier networks. Around the world, domestic fi rms with greater access to credit show themselves to be able to self-select into supplier status. Using data from 72 countries for the period 1975-95, Laura Alfaro, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Selin Sayek (2009) show that countries with better-functioning fi nancial systems enjoy higher total factor productivity among suppliers.
So reform of the fi nancial sector is an important ingredient of providing a business-friendly setting for domestic companies to grow and prosper.
Finally, a host government may want to copy host authorities elsewhere that have set up "vendor development" programs with the goal of promoting backward linkages from foreign investors. Th e fi rst step is to work with foreign investor business associations to create programs that prepare local fi rms to acquire certifi cation within appropriate parameters, including ISO 9000 quality control. Beyond this, many countries have followed Singapore's Economic Development Board (EDB) model for supplier development.
EDB reimburses the salary of an engineer or manager in each foreign plant who is assigned to act as a talent scout to select and assist local fi rms in becoming suppliers. As part of its Local Industry Upgrading Program (LIUP), EDB provides capital for domestic fi rms to buy equipment recommended by foreign investors, to be paid back from purchase contracts awarded by the foreigners. Originally dedicated to building supplier relationships in the electronics sector, LIUP now covers medical products, petroleum and petrochemical, marine, transportation and logistics, and information technology clusters.
Beyond Singapore, Malaysia establishes secondary industrial zones alongside the major export processing zones (EPZs), with databanks and "marriage counselors" to assist in supplier selection. Penang Skills Development Center has opened its doors to allow domestic fi rms to partake of a curriculum organized around specifi c needs and skill gaps identifi ed by foreign multinationals as important for their suppliers to master or overcome.
Th e debates about how to establish links between foreign investors and potential host country supplier fi rms are unsettled. Should the host set up industrial zones for local supplier candidates adjacent to formal export processing zones (as in Malaysia)? Or should the host make export processing a legal status, rather than a geographical site, that allows the foreigner to export from wherever is most favorable, with potential suppliers following the foreign fi rm anywhere it settles (as in Mauritius)? In either case, export processing regulations must not discriminate against the creation of local supplier relationships.
And in every case, it is important that EPZs spearhead broader business-friendly reforms throughout the host economy-to provide a widespread favorable setting for local fi rms' growth-and not become a substitute for such reforms.
Th e analysis of how to design policies to promote backward linkages would not be complete without introducing one more controversial discovery into the debate. Contrary to popular rhetoric, there is no empirical basis for giving preferential attention to small and medium-sized fi rms (SMEs) if the goal is to strengthen the supplier base. Th e evidence is that medium-sized and larger domestic fi rms are usually better candidates to qualify as suppliers because the gap between their capabilities and the capabilities of those who wish to purchase their inputs is typically smaller than at small fi rms (Freund 2011) .
Developing country authorities frequently confound supply chain creation with support for SMEs.
So do corporate social responsibility (CSR) advocates, including CSR offi cers in the MNCs themselves.
A close look at case studies of supplier-and vendor-development programs, however, does not support the proposition that small fi rms should be the preferred targets for host country matchmakers or MNC talent scouts. Despite its title, the evidence in the latest study by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "How to Create and Benefi t from FDI-SME Linkages: Lessons from Malaysia and Singapore" (Best Practices in Investment for Development series), for example, shows that medium-sized and larger indigenous companies "are more likely than their smaller counterparts to possess capabilities needed for linkages that result in 'win-win' scenarios" (UNCTAD 2011). Th us host countries will be most successful in generating backward linkages from foreign investors to domestic fi rms if they do not let supplier-support programs be captured by small-business lobbies.
DIGRESSION: WHAT CONSTITUTES A SATISFACTORY LEVEL OF BACKWARD LINKAGES AND VERTICAL SUPPLY CHAINS?
What is an "acceptable" spread of backward linkages and vertical supply chains? What is the appropriate relationship between quantity and quality? And what is the best metric for comparing relative levels of linkages and supply chains among countries? Perhaps the only consistent observation across country measurements is that whatever the host country achieves is never enough, and the grass is always greener elsewhere.
Early supplier relationships around the world usually start with the provision of simple services (e.g., transport, cleaning, canteen, construction, and security) and simple inputs (e.g., packaging and construction materials). In the three cases where the host used FDI to upgrade and diversify the country's production and export base-Malaysia, the Czech Republic, and Costa Rica-these primitive supplier functions have been supplemented by the creation of more local networks to provide complex services and components.
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In Malaysia, foreign investors began to generate increasingly sophisticated backward linkage networks in the 1980s. Firm-level research in the electronics sector reported that US and European companies provided engineering help to domestic fi rms to enable them to meet precise design specifi cations (Rasiah 1995) . Foreign MNCs in the telecommunications and semiconductor industries assigned technicians to suppliers' plants to assist them in setting up large-volume production and quality control procedures. One study of nine Japanese electronics multinationals identifi ed deliberate transfers to Malaysian suppliers that took the form of new product and process technologies, product-design specifi cations, advice on the use of equipment, and help with the solution of specifi c technical problems (Capanelli 1997) . Th ese kinds of assistance to local fi rms would not qualify as a true externality to the host economy if the recipients remained captive suppliers to those who provided the help, but the Malaysian fi rms used the knowledge gained to become contract manufacturers to the electronics industry more generally. In the Czech Republic survey data reveal that 90 percent of 119 majority-owned multinational investors have purchased inputs from at least one Czech supplier (Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005a) .
Th e median MNC affi liate acquires inputs from 10 local fi rms; one affi liate in the top quartile acquires inputs from at least 30 Czech fi rms; and one-tenth of those surveyed acquired all of their intermediates from local suppliers. Th e multinational investors in the Czech Republic do business in sectors spanning electrical machinery, communications equipment, motor vehicles and other transport equipment, fabricated metals, rubber, nonmetallic mineral products, pulp and paper products, furniture, printing, chemicals, food products, and textiles.
Of the three countries using FDI relatively successfully to build an array of domestic industries, Costa Rica shows perhaps the most modest success in developing backward linkages and supply chains.
Th is may be due to the comparative lack of depth and capability in the country's business community. 
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Recent research shows that Chinese use of tariff s, which generally have served to stifl e competition, have been regularly associated with worse fi rm performance than policies that worked to increase competition (Aghion et al. 2014) . Specifi cally, Luosha Du, Ann Harrison, and Gary Jeff erson (2014) fi nd that the increased competition that accompanied China's tariff reductions and entry into the WTO induced both backward linkages from foreign buyers to domestic suppliers and forward linkages from foreign suppliers to domestic buyers. Th ey suggest that elimination of domestic content requirements spurred technology transfer and other spillovers from foreign to domestic fi rms.
Analysis of the cases presented here shows the clear need for a few specifi c public sector interventions to best harness FDI for development, but suggests that developing country authorities confi ne their eff orts to light-form industrial policy and eschew heavy-form strategies.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS FOR HOST COUNTRIES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, DONOR COUNTRIES IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD, AND MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Th e evidence reviewed here highlights the prime importance for would-be host countries to improve the business-friendly setting in which both foreign and domestic fi rms can operate. Th is objective is essential for developing countries that want to use FDI to both diversify and upgrade their production and export base, and to generate competitive supply chains deep into their economy. Reforms in on-theground treatment of foreign and host country companies have been shown to be a necessary but not suffi cient condition for success. Host countries must supplement such reforms with carefully constructed policy interventions to overcome market imperfections and obstacles along the way. To a certain extent, emerging market hosts can carry out these policy interventions on their own. But the cases reviewed show that external support is often crucial to success.
Contemporary international business policy discourse often implies, indeed sometimes assumes, that with the explosion of international private sector investment fl ows there is less need for developed country donors and multilateral fi nancial institutions to support growth and development programs-as opposed to pure poverty reduction programs-especially in middle-income emerging markets. But the cases reviewed show that there is a vital role for external donors, including the aid agencies of developed countries, the World Bank Group, and the regional development banks, to improve the functioning of markets so that emerging countries can better harness FDI for development.
Th e logical place to start is support for eff ective FDI promotion eff orts and strategies. Th e evidence confi rms that information markets are highly imperfect and developing countries need help in learning how to use investment promotion agencies to market their country eff ectively to multinational investors.
Such marketing eff orts will be futile, however, unless the IPA has good products to promote-that is, the ability to show that business-friendly macroeconomic, microeconomic, and institutional reforms are in place or credibly under way. Simply preaching "Reform! Reform!" from afar is not suffi cient. Developing countries often need practical guidance about how to take proactive steps to search out and attract new investors.
Investment promotion agencies must learn how to master the simple tasks of being responsive to investor queries, answering the phone, and responding to email with up-to-date information about economic conditions and regulations (World Bank Group 2009). IPA staff must be able to provide details-or better, mobilize responses-that go beyond what is posted on the website.
Beyond being responsive, however, the data reviewed in this paper confi rm that there is demonstrable payoff to targeting investors in sectors and to developing expertise about the characteristics and needs of international companies in those sectors. Th is is a complicated and expensive undertaking, and would-be hosts that want to use FDI to upgrade and diversify the production and export base of their economies need training and counseling. Th e cases examined here are particularly useful in showing how to design trade and investment strategies to move less developed countries toward the ranks of more developed economies.
In addition to help with marketing strategies, IPAs must be shown how to achieve the oft-claimed, but less often achieved, status of serving as a one-stop shop for securing permits, permissions, and appropriate regulatory treatment for investors that want to launch a new operation. How successful IPAs have managed to accomplish this deserves detailed comparative research, the results of which can then be passed on to developing country offi cials.
In addition to marketing the country and attracting initial investors, IPAs need to emphasize afterinvestment care. Th e energy devoted to following up with initial investors is signifi cant because of the size of potential reinvested earnings, because of the demonstration eff ect of satisfi ed investors in attracting other new investors, and because of the potential for cluster development as fi rst-tier suppliers follow primes.
External support for this follow-on function opens the door to the controversial area of identifying policy reform champions in the host economy and helping them engage in policy advocacy. External donors can help fashion alliances of multinational investors, domestic companies, and reform-minded agencies to infl uence the political economy of policy formation in the host country.
Design of strategies to improve the host investment climate is not the only area in which policy advocacy will quickly become enmeshed in sensitive areas of controversy. External support for eff ective investment promotion requires toolkits, training initiatives, and capacity building for the sectors involved.
For FDI in middle-and upper-skilled industrial activities-which have received predominant attention in this paper-the evidence off ers particularly important insights. Host governments that want to use FDI to upgrade and diversify their industrial production and export base need the resources 36 to integrate investment promotion per se with programs of infrastructure support and vocational training. Alongside such programs, host authorities and international donors alike must acknowledge the importance of labor market fl exibility, in particular fl exibility for fi rms to adjust workforce size in response to fl uctuations in supply and demand (as pointed out, the key issue is ease of hiring and laying off workers, not hiring and fi ring workers as if the latter were termination for cause). Donor support in fashioning such investment promotion packages will not be eff ective if the outcome includes only two of these ingredients, not all three. To be sure, external advocacy to combine all three-infrastructure upgrades, vocational training partnerships, and labor market reforms-may be awkward, or worse. But it is essential.
Turning to promotion of backward linkages from foreign investors to local suppliers, the design of host strategies to meet the challenges involved has become a central focus in relating trade and investment to vigorous domestic development. In this endeavor the most important observation is also the most obvious: prospects for creating reliable and competitive domestic supplier fi rms require a business-friendly environment no less favorable than what is enjoyed by international investors. Supply chain development will falter if domestic companies do not enjoy effi cient judicial systems, predictable regulatory regimes, and competitive market conditions.
Once again, however, while favorable doing-business indicators are a necessary condition for host supplier development, they may not be a suffi cient condition for success. Th e evidence reviewed here shows positive benefi ts from external advice and support in creating supplier databases, setting up qualifi cation and certifi cation programs, training talent scouts and marriage brokers, and forming equipment fi nancing programs backed by purchase agreements from foreign buyers. But host policy interventions can go too far, producing negative and counterproductive consequences by imposing heavyhanded mandatory domestic content requirements, joint venture mandates, and technology sharing regulations on foreign investors in the hope of creating viable supplier networks.
Even when host supplier development programs are carried out in an appropriately light-handed manner, however, the more promising candidates to achieve OEM status or other certifi cation arecontrary to popular rhetoric-usually medium-sized or larger local companies, not smaller businesses.
Th e tendency of supply chain development programs to be captured by small-business lobbies, and the willingness of international donors to tolerate, even promote this, has adverse consequences for emerging economies.
According to the evidence reviewed, the potential for local supplier development varies widely (Farole and Winkler 2014) . In the extractive sector, for example, the capital intensity and sophistication of drilling or mining equipment often limit host country supplier relationships to the provision of maintenance, catering, and security services, although some local fi rms have managed to produce pumps, conveyor belts, and other equipment on a competitive basis. In the textile and garment sector, trade restrictions and rules of origin greatly constrain the search for domestic sources of supply. On the other hand, in the agribusiness sector (processed foods, cut fl owers and vegetables, prepared fruits and juices) the development of connections with regional and international markets can introduce hundreds of thousands of local farmers to the formal economy.
With regard to middle-and higher-skilled manufacturing FDI, the evidence shows that the payoff from help in promoting local supply chain development is sizable. And when host country fi rms achieve OEM or other supplier certifi cation, the international corporations that purchase their goods and services not infrequently introduce them to affi liates in the region, creating an export externality. Th e newly launched supplier fi rms meanwhile often spin off simpler functions to second-and third-tier local providers in the original economy.
For developing countries, developed countries, and multilateral fi nancial institutions, trade policy liberalization remains an important goal on the development agenda. Alongside this liberalization, trade facilitation has well-justifi ed standing as a key objective for international assistance. But as trade and investment are increasingly linked, support for emerging market economies to use FDI to upgrade and diversify their production and export base-and to develop reliable and competitive supply chains deep into the local economy-is the new frontier for assistance from the developed country and multilateral donor community.
Most developed countries recognize that they serve their own interests as well as those of the developing world by helping home companies identify investment opportunities abroad as well as export opportunities. Sixteen of the 22 major developed countries help home-based multinationals both export to and invest in developing economies; three (the United States, Ireland, and Belgium) do not (CGD 2010 (CGD -2012 . Th e US Foreign Commercial Service, for example, assists US fi rms in bidding on foreign contracts and developing export markets, but is not trained or allowed to assist American companies in setting up supply chains abroad. A preoccupation in the United States is fear that outward investment by US multinationals weakens the domestic economy and undermines the potential for domestic job creation. Th is is a debate too vast for thorough treatment here, but careful analysis of the recent research affi rms that outward investment from the United States (and other developed economies) complements rather than substitutes for economic activity in the domestic economy (Hufbauer, Moran, and Oldenski 2013 CGD 2010 CGD -2012 . Concern about Congressional reaction also eff ectively prevents OPIC from off ering support to investors who wish to establish or manage export processing zones. What is needed instead is to rededicate OPIC to its original mission of promoting development by providing political risk insurance to projects that most benefi t poorer countries. Alongside OPIC, meanwhile, the US Millennium Challenge Corporation should work with recipient countries to design compacts that overcome constraints to investment, tying local entrepreneurs to global markets and helping authorities implement compacts that facilitate both local and multinational private sector activity.
Finally, looking toward the future, developed and developing countries alike would benefi t from a serious multilateral eff ort to limit locational incentives, subsidies, and other giveaway programs as alternative sites compete to attract international investment around the world. n.a. = not applicable; IDZs = industrial development zones a. Doing-business indicators in export zones without considering labor market flexibility.
Note: The "plus" signs signify that these policy interventions were important and essential, the "minus" signs indicate that these policy interventions have not been fully implemented or (due to paucity of inward FDI) implemented at all.
Source: Author's analysis.
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